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From the literature on error detection, the authors select several concepts
relating error detection mechanisms and prospective memory features. They
emphasize the central role of intention in the classiﬁcation of the errors into
slips/lapses/mistakes, in the error handling process and in the usual
distinction between action-based and outcome-based detection. Intention is
again a core concept in their investigation of prospective memory theory,
where they point out the contribution of intention retrievals, intention
persistence and output monitoring in the individual’s possibilities for
detecting their errors. The involvement of the frontal lobes in prospective
memory and in error detection is also analysed. From the chronology of a
prospective memory task, the authors ﬁnally suggest a model for error
detection also accounting for neural mechanisms highlighted by studies on
error-related brain activity.
Keywords: Error detection; Prospective memory; Intention; Error-related
brain activity
1. Introduction
Early studies on human error focused on the origins of errors and on the mechanisms
involved in their production. This ﬁrst phase research gave birth to various classiﬁcations
according to the nature, the form and the consequences of human errors. A main eﬀort
was thus dedicated to the ﬁeld of error prevention, leading sometimes to the elaboration
of sophisticated aids. At that time it appeared necessary to account more eﬀectively for
contextual and organizational issues in the production of errors.
Recently, the focus moved progressively from error prevention towards error recovery
and/or management. Safety systems are now a status quo and a new research trend
considers that human error is inescapable (Amalberti 1996) and even that it is not desirable
to eliminate it completely (Hasbroucq et al. 2000). The role of underlying factors in error
production justiﬁes both the continuation of studies on error prevention and the
development of researches in order to master errors by reducing their consequences
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(Reason 1990, Frese 1991, Amalberti 1996, Doireau et al. 1997, Nyssen 1997). Reducing
the consequences of error not only means managing them, through tolerant systems, for
example, but also recovering from them. And error recovery depends on error detection.
The mechanisms involved in the detection of errors or in their recovery remain little
known. This paper intends to suggest new areas of investigation in order to identify what
can help someone in the detection of their own errors. In the ﬁrst part, a state of the art
on error detection is presented. In the second part, there is an investigation into how the
theoretical background of prospective memory (PM) and, more generally, the theory of
intentions might provide new enlightenment. Finally, a model of reﬂection on the
relationship between error detection and PM is proposed.
2. Error and error detection
2.1. Deﬁnitions and classiﬁcations of error
This investigation of error detection and error recovery was based on selected deﬁnitions
and classiﬁcations of the various types of errors. An error can be deﬁned as ‘a non
attainment of a goal’ (Norman 1981, Reason 1990, Zapf et al. 1992, 1994). Another
deﬁnition is ‘a deviation from the norm’ (Leplat 1985), ‘when the individual had the prior
intention and the possibility to reach this goal’ (De Keyser and Nyssen 1993). The norm
can be internal or external. Both these deﬁnitions emphasize the concepts of goal, norm
and intention. One of the objectives was indeed to focus on their role in error detection
and recovery processes. The second deﬁnition, in particular, is more precise and relates
the error to the intention, a fundamental concept for Reason (1990) and Sellen (1990).
Moreover, this deﬁnition points to internal and psychological aspects of the error
(Reason 1990), being thus closer to the objective, namely focusing on the individual’s role
in error detection.
It is important to distinguish between the causes and the consequences of an error.
Hollnagel (1998) calls ‘phenotypes’ the observable manifestations of the error and
‘genotypes’ the causes of the error. A phenotype can be explained by diﬀerent genotypes
and a genotype can be at the origin of various phenotypes.
Many works have dealt with the causes of error, i.e. with the various mechanisms
involved in error production; these works have given rise to several taxonomies for error
classiﬁcations. The ﬁrst classiﬁcation made by Reason (1990) distinguished mistakes,
lapses and slips. However, at the present time, another classiﬁcation devised by Reason,
called generic error model system and established from Rasmussen’s activity levels (1987),
is most often used. This classiﬁcation is one of the most famous in the literature because
its decontextual aspect allows its use in all types of situations (Grant 1997, Kirwan 1998).
Other classiﬁcations are presented and used, such as of Norman’s (1981), which
categorizes the slips according to three possible origins: the formation of the intention;
the activation; the triggering. Another classiﬁcation was established by Zapf et al. (1994)
and classiﬁes the error types in function of the level of action regulation (three levels). The
diﬀerent error classiﬁcations are summarized in table 1.
For what follows, the basic classiﬁcation of Reason (1990) will be referred to,
distinguishing between slips, lapses and mistakes. This error classiﬁcation seems most
useful for identifying the detection processes because it points out the individual’s role in
the occurrence of errors and, thus, their possibilities for detecting their own errors. This
taxonomy allows the attribution of a possible origin to an error and to locate this error in
one of the three main stages that range from the conception (planning) to the production
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(execution) of an action sequence through a storage (retention) of the information. The
planning involves processes that identify the goal and the ways to reach it. As an action
rarely occurs directly after its planning, a storage phase (retention in memory) is generally
essential between the formulation of desired actions and their execution.
. Mistakes are due to planning problems (the action is executed according to the plan
and the intention, but the plan is wrong).
. Lapses result of retention deﬁcits (the intention is not retrieved or recalled on time or
at all).
. Slips are the consequences of execution problems (the plan is correct but the execution
is wrong because the action is not appropriate to the intention).
An example is the action of making coﬀee:
. if one boils the water before putting it in the coﬀee-machine, it is a mistake (because
the plan of making coﬀee is wrong);
. if one forgets that the coﬀee is ready or forgets to do it, it is a lapse (because the
information of making coﬀee is not retrieved);
. if, automatically, one puts milk instead of water or makes tea instead of coﬀee, it is a
slip (because the error is caused by an interference with a highly automatic activity).
Reason’s (1990) classiﬁcation accounts for cognitive processes while relating the
occurrence of errors (and thus the mechanisms involved in error production) both to
the degree of control (automatic behaviour vs. controlled behaviour) and to memory
characteristics or even memory failures. It thus appears a helpful basis for the ﬁnal
elaboration of an integrated model identifying mechanisms and processes involved in
error detection at various levels.
2.2. Error detection and recovery
Error detection and error recovery are two linked processes although the literature deals
more frequently with error detection. The authors are particularly interested by the ‘error
handling’ process that can be deﬁned as the process starting with the error detection and
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going through to the error recovery (Zapf and Reason 1994). This process sets oﬀ after
the occurrence of an error and involves two stages: error diagnosis (which involves both
error detection and error explanation); and error recovery (including planning and
execution of the recovery action). Error detection is thus really the ﬁrst step in the error
handling process and is usually deﬁned as ‘the realization that an error has occurred
independently from knowing what the error is like and how it came about’ (Zapf and
Reason 1994).
Other descriptions of the detection and recovery processes exist in the literature but the
diﬀerences between them remain subtle. Detection and recovery mechanisms are usually
described in the following order (Rizzo et al. 1995).
2.2.1. Mismatch between the outcome and the initial intention. This mismatch may have
three sources:
. A forcing function, which stops the individual in their action and prevents them from
continuing their action as long as the error is not recovered (Reason 1990).
. An external feedback, when a mismatch is suggested by information from the
environment.
. An internal feedback, when a mismatch is spontaneously suggested by the individual’s
working memory and cannot be directly found in the environment.
The internal feedback would only permit picking out the slips, while the mistakes would
be entirely signalled by limiting functions or external feedback (Sellen 1990). These
observations are in line with Norman’s (1981) analysis that diﬀerentiates slips detection
from mistakes detection. Indeed, in the case of mistakes, there is no internal mismatch
between the initial intention and the ongoing action. However, this mismatch does not
always lead to a review of the actions or of the results (Rizzo et al. 1995).
2.2.2. Error detection. The person becomes aware of the error because of a strange
action or outcome. The individual realizes that ‘an error has occurred independently from
understanding the nature and the cause of the error’ (Zapf et al. 1992, Zapf and Reason
1994).
According to Reason (1990), there are three ways to detect an error:
1. The auto-control process is based on automatism and is physiologically the most
eﬀective. The errors discovered, thanks to self-detection, are recovered in to 90% of
the cases (Doireau et al. 1997). This type of detection often occurs during the action
execution and the error occurrence is not always picked out (the error stays at an
early stage). This process is triggered by the activation of pre-attentional control
mechanisms that work like immediate ﬁlters or censors of the ongoing actions. These
mechanisms involve a regulation of the comparisons between the outcome and the
intention (Norman 1981).
2. The environment (for example, the forcing functions may also have a role here).
3. A third person (often the only way to bring to the detection of diagnosis errors in
complex and stressful situations). Woods (1984) showed that execution errors (slips)
are easily detectable by operators (self-detection) but the identiﬁcation of diagnosis
errors require the intervention of an outsider, a ‘new mind’. For example, in the
diagnostic error cases, the operators involved in the action are often victims of a
ﬁxation on their schema, which prevents them changing their system state
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representation and so detecting the error (Nyssen 1997). Error detection by a third
person seems not frequent (Doireau et al. (1997) obtained a rate of 30%) but in these
cases, the person who has detected the error is convinced of his judgement (and all
the more so since the person is an expert, Doireau et al. 1997). In this situation, the
error detection achievement depends on several factors: outsiders will detect more
easily an error if they are experts in the domain; if the error is a mistake rather than a
slip; and if the detection is contemporaneous of the error (Doireau et al. 1997).
2.2.3. Recovery. The individual tries to suppress or to reduce the mismatch. At this
stage, he/she must know both how to recover the error eﬀects and how to achieve the
desired goal. Once the error has been detected, the recovery can actually take on two
forms: either the individuals try to suppress the consequences of their error; or they try to
contain them and ‘manage’ their error, especially in cases when the consequences are
irreversible (Sellen 1990).
Recovery is certainly the less-developed point in the literature and is usually considered
as the last step of the whole process. As mentioned above, it appears that an early
recovery is possible. This is also conﬁrmed by some researches on muscular contraction in
choice reaction time tasks, where a correction can even take place before the error
occurrence. In this case, the error is called an ‘error sketch’ (Smid et al. 1990) because the
error is just going to appear but is corrected in time. Indeed, in choice reaction time task,
Coles et al. (1985) and Eriksen et al. (1985) have observed an infraliminar contraction of
the agonist muscle of the arm associated with the wrong response. This contraction
occurred more often than not when the distractors were incompatible with the stimulus
and the reaction time was longer when this infraliminar wrong response was observed.
The error sketch is the infraliminar contraction of the agonist muscle of the wrong
response preceding the correct response execution. The muscular contraction would not
attain a suﬃcient level to produce a manifest error and the error sketch would be directly
corrected, thus permitting the correct response execution. These observations show the
existence of a correction process using a retroaction loop at a very early stage. Several
studies have shown that, at the sensori-motor level, the participants committed ten times
more error sketches than errors. All these error sketches were corrected at the proper time
and allowed the execution of the correct response. These observations show the central
role of recuperation in the subject performance. Further experiments could bring more
information on the diﬀerences between these early recovery processes and those that
operate later.
These descriptions of the ‘error handling’ process are as yet in the early stages and there
is a lack of general agreement on this point. Sellen (1990, 1994) and Sellen and Norman
(1992) suggested another view with the addition of a supplementary stage between error
detection and error recovery: error identiﬁcation. At this stage, the person compares the
erroneous results with those that were expected and identiﬁes which error has occurred.
According to Sellen (1990) and Sellen and Norman (1992), the three processes are distinct
and conceptually separable. It is indeed possible to detect an error without identifying it,
as well as identifying an error without recovering it.
Considering that most of the authors agree that error detection occurs independently
from knowing what the error is like and how it came about, the error identiﬁcation
process seems to be essential. Moreover, the ﬁrst two stages of the description by Rizzo et
al. (1995), i.e. mismatch and error detection, appear to be very similar. Indeed, they
involve the same processes – the auto-control corresponding to the internal feedback, the
environment corresponding to the external feedback and the forcing function. This is why
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they are associated in a single step. Another description of the global process could be the
following (Sellen and Norman 1992):
. Error detection, involving mismatch.
. Error identiﬁcation, i.e. knowing what the error is like.
. Error recovery, i.e. suppressing or managing the error’s consequences.
2.3. Classiﬁcation of detection mechanisms
Allwood’s (1984) classiﬁcation provided a ﬁrst taxonomy of mechanisms supporting error
detection. This study is still helpful and has oﬀered a ﬁrst and rich survey of the detection
behaviours, staying however at a behavioural level. Allwood and Montgomery (1982)
were the ﬁrst to create experiments in which the only goal was the understanding of error
detection mechanisms. They found four error detection strategies during the resolution of
statistical problems:
1. Aﬃrmative evaluation: evaluation according to the knowledge of the result (the
individual evaluates their result according to what they know about the expected
result).
2. Standard check: the individual controls the environment without precise suspicion
and ﬁnds his/her error. It takes place independently of any feedback from obtained
results or of the procedures that were adopted.
3. Direct error hypothesis formation: the individual suddenly detects and/or corrects a
real or suspected error. He/she reacts to a strange result and directly forms a
hypothesis on the committed error type.
4. Error suspicion: The individual is perplexed about the obtained results or the
adopted procedures but he/she cannot formulate any explicative hypothesis.
The Allwood taxonomy (Allwood 1984, Allwood and Montgomery 1982) is a
categorization of the types of behavioural episodes in which the detection of errors
tends to occur and cannot be used as a classiﬁcation of cognitive mechanisms of error
detection (Sellen 1994).
Sellen (1994) and Sellen and Norman (1992) described diﬀerent mechanisms involved
in the error detection process, considering that errors occur at various levels in the action.
In her study, she observed four levels in which the errors can be detected.
2.3.1. Action-based detection. The individual detects the error from some aspects of the
action itself (visual, proprioceptive or auditory information). This method allows the
detection of the following.
2.3.1.1. Mismatches between an action plan and executed actions. For example, someone
typing on a computer can know that he/she has committed a typing error without looking
at the screen and without any visual feedback of the consequence. According to Rabbitt
(1978), people would even be able to detect typing errors before committing them. This
aﬃrmation requires the existence of a mechanism that predicts the correctness of
incipient actions rather than the correctness of the actions themselves (Sellen 1994). This
is in accordance with the ‘error sketching out’ (Smid et al. 1990) mentioned earlier.
According to Hayes and Flowers (1980), the simultaneity of error production and error
detection requires the existence of cognitive mechanisms of pre-attentional control that
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immediately censor the ongoing action. This type of error detection is similar to Reason’s
(1990) auto-control concept.
2.3.1.2. Mismatches between conscious intentions and executed actions. For example, a
person wants to make coﬀee and makes tea. These slips are often actions that are
perfectly appropriate in other situations, i.e. with other intentions. Most of the time, only
the person executing the action can detect the error. For Sellen (1994), the intentions and
executed actions are temporarily disconnected and a very automatic action is executed
instead of the intended action. This disconnection is made possible because the attention
is directed at another event. Detection could thus occur only when the attention goes
back to the initial intention. Detection occurs when the subject becomes aware that the
action he/she is executing does not correspond with his/her intention.
2.3.2. Outcome-based detection. The individual detects an error through the result of the
action and, more particularly, because of an unexpected result. In this case, the detection
will depend on the individual’s possibilities of interpreting the outcomes, but also on the
experience acquired from past erroneous actions (Sellen 1994).
Three reasons can explain why the error is not detected from the action (1) (i.e. at the
ﬁrst stage) (2). First, the mismatch between action plan and executed actions or between
intention and executed actions may not be strong enough to signal an error. Second, the
intention itself can be erroneous (for example, in the case of mistakes with planning
errors). Finally, the action can be correct but lead to an unexpected result.
When action-based detection fails, Sellen (1994) describes two ways of detecting errors
on the basis of the outcome.
2.3.2.1. Mismatches between expected outcomes and actual outcomes. These mismatches
can occur only when there are some expectations about the result of actions, when the
eﬀects of actions are perceptible, when the environment is suﬃciently monitored and
when the person is able to link the violation of their expectation and their actions (Sellen
et al. 1990, Sellen 1994). Moreover, the expectation is related to the subject’s goals that
can be well speciﬁed or, on the contrary, very vague. The familiarity with the task, the
domain and the nature of the task are some factors that determine the accuracy of the
goal’s speciﬁcation. This detection process is situated both at the perceptual level and at
the conceptual level.
2.3.2.2. Matches between expected error forms and outcome. The subject knows that he/
she tends to make some types of errors. Then, he/she veriﬁes whether these errors have
been committed by observing the outcomes. For example, during the month of January, a
lot of people know that they tend to write the date of the previous year.
2.3.3. Detection through an external limiting function. The error is detected because the
individual is blocked by physical constraints from the external environment and cannot
produce any further action (for example, when someone cannot open a door because they
use a wrong key). This type of detection is the same as the forcing function described
earlier.
2.3.4. Detection by another person. The subject fails to detect his/her error from his/her
action because he/she has monitored a wrong aspect of the action. He/she also fails to
detect it from the outcome because the eﬀects of the action were not (directly) perceptible
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and/or because the subject was not familiar enough with the domain, which made the
goal not speciﬁed enough (Sellen 1994).
Sellen’s (1994) taxonomy lays more emphasis on the cognitive processes. It shows the
diﬀerent levels at which mismatches can appear. Slips are more often detected through
action, and mistakes through outcome. Indeed, slips are in conﬂict with intentions and
can be detected either through the action or through the outcome when action-based
detection has failed. On the contrary, mistakes are not in conﬂict with the plans and can
be detected through outcome only.
However, this classiﬁcation does not completely explain the cognitive process of error
detection. Detection is made possible by the emergence of various types of mismatches.
This emergence itself requires the existence of a mechanism assuming the comparison
between the expected action (or outcome) and the actual action (or outcome). A ﬁrst
comparison occurs at the action level. When action-based detection fails (e.g. in the case
of mistakes) a second comparison process occurs at the outcome level. When outcome-
based detection also fails, only the forcing function or the discovery by another person
may allow detection.
2.4. Error detection and cerebral waves
In the former sections, the focus has been on data concerning behavioural strategies
(Allwood 1984) and cognitive mechanisms (Sellen 1994) that allow error detection. Other
data come from studies on the error-related brain activity, showing the existence and the
localization of some error detection mechanisms in the cortex. They reveal, in particular,
the existence of two components in the event-related brain potential (ERP) associated
with the error and its control.
The ﬁrst is called error negativity (Falkenstein et al. 1991, 1995) or error-related
negativity (ERN; Gerhing et al. 1993). This EEG wave was observed when the subjects
committed an error in a choice reaction time task (Falkenstein et al. 1991). This wave
seemed not to appear when the responses were correct. It was then interpreted as
reﬂecting the occurrence of an error detection mechanism (Gerhing et al. 1993). Later,
some authors have shown that the ERN also appeared with ‘error sketching out’
(Scheﬀers et al. 1996), with correct but late responses (in this case the amplitude was
smaller) and also with correct responses (Luu et al. 2000, Vidal et al. 2000). Thus, the
ERN would not reﬂect the process of error detection but rather a process of execution
control that appears when the individual has a bad auto evaluation of their performance
(rightly when he/she has committed an error and wrongly when their response is correct).
Scheﬀers and Coles (2000) deﬁned the ERN as the manifestation of a process verifying
the accuracy and appropriateness of a behaviour or a response. They consider that this
wave is not associated with the activation of a high-level control process. It would rather
reﬂect a low-level monitoring process that controls the activation of speciﬁc schemes.
Falkenstein et al. (1995) and Gerhing et al. (1993) asked their participants to respond
as quickly as possible and thus to favour quickness over accuracy. They observed that the
ERN amplitude reduced with these orders. In fact, the ERN had a smaller amplitude
when errors were made under task conditions that favoured speed over accuracy
(Gerhing et al. 1993). This observation is compatible with the hypothesis of execution
control: these quickness orders would incite the execution control to be less strict and
thus to react to a lesser extent to errors. This would explain the reduction of the ERN
amplitude. Moreover, the ERN would not reﬂect an objective process but a subjective
error monitoring and evaluation (Luu et al. 2000) and its amplitude would depend on the
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subjective awareness of the error commission (Dehaene et al. 1994). Thus, its apparition
and amplitude depend among other things on some personality factors, such as the mood
or the eﬀect (thus, the ERN amplitude is selectively related to the negative aﬀect and the
negative emotionality; Luu et al. 2000).
This wave speciﬁcally appears above the Supplementary Motor Areas (SMA) and/or
the anterior cingulate cortex (Luu et al. 2000, Vidal et al. 2000). However, the exact
location varies according to diﬀerent studies. This is certainly due to the diﬀerent nature
of the tasks and to the various cognitive mechanisms and cortical areas.
Thus, the ERN does not reﬂect the error detection process itself. Research, however,
has shown the existence of another wave called error positivity (PE) that appears after the
ERN when an error has occurred (Falkenstein et al. 1991, Vidal et al. 2000). This wave
does not appear when the response is correct (even late), nor when the error is in its early
stages (Scheﬀers et al. 1996, Luu et al. 2000, Vidal et al. 2000). Thus, the PE would be
speciﬁc to the committed errors (an error corrected in time is not suﬃcient to trigger it)
and would reﬂect the error detection process (Vidal et al. 2000).
2.5. Conclusion
The classiﬁcation of errors into slips/mistakes/lapses allows the distinguishing of various
detection mechanisms. Slips appear to be more easily and quickly detected and recovered
(Rizzo et al. 1987, see also Zapf et al. 1994 for errors at the sensori-motor level), while the
detection of mistakes is rather diﬃcult and often requires an external intervention
(Woods 1984, Reason 1990), even if Doireau et al. (1997) observed the opposite in their
experiments, in which the error was detected by an observer and not by the operator. In
these cases, the observer who did not perform the action detected the mistakes more
easily than the slips committed by the operator.
Moreover, the detection of mistakes may require more time for a lesser success. The
number of slips increases signiﬁcantly with the task’s complexity, but so does their
detection. On the contrary, the complexity of the task does not inﬂuence either the
number of mistakes or their detection. The processes involved in the detection of these
two types of errors might thus be diﬀerent and lead to diverse detection performances.
However, a speciﬁc type of slip, omissions, is more diﬃcult to detect than any other error.
All errors based on automatism (slips) are thus not always the more easily detectable
errors: some omissions remain widely invisible (Reason 1990).
ERN and PE waves constitute evidence for the existence of neural mechanisms related
to error. These observations show that an execution control steps in during the treatment
of the sensori-motor information. This execution control would permit the detection of
errors in the early stages (and would be reﬂected by the ERN) and would also signal that
an error has just occurred (this process would be reﬂected by a PE wave). These
observations were made in the case of execution tasks. The waves could be related to the
auto-control process described by Reason (1990) and to the action-based detection
proposed by Sellen (1994).
3. Prospective memory, intention and error detection
3.1. Why prospective memory?
Most errors appear to be detected because of a mismatch between the expected action
(or outcome) and the actual action (or outcome). But not much is known about the
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comparison process itself. Sometimes, people think spontaneously and without any
contextual factor about a previously formed intention and they realize that they did not
perform it as they intended to do, or even that they did not realize their intention. Such
a spontaneous error detection is related to mechanisms characterizing PM: intention
persistence and recurrent intention retrievals. PM research is usually interested in these
mechanisms because they support the PM performance itself by keeping the intention in
mind during the retention interval. When the same mechanisms occur after the
performance interval or after the task realization, they will contribute to error
detection.
The concept of intention was already a core concept in the ﬁrst part of this paper. This
concept has been given a main place in the deﬁnition of error. Further descriptions by
many authors conﬁrm that intention is really the reference point with which ongoing
action or actual outcomes are compared, thus allowing the detection of a potential error.
However, its role is diﬀerent in the case of slips or in the case of mistakes. A slip is an
error in the execution of an intention, which brings about, in a quite direct way, a conﬂict
between the performed action(s) and the individual’s intention. A mistake is an error due
to an ill-formed intention (Sellen 1994), in that case there is no conﬂict between action
and intention.
This major role of intention, intention persistence and intention retrievals led to the
investigation as to how the background of PM might enlighten the mechanisms allowing
error detection. First, because the execution of an action requires the retrieval of the
intention, which is the main role of PM. Second, the return of the attention to the
intention is essential in order to detect slips (Sellen 1994). Finally, Reason’s (1990)
classiﬁcation into slips/mistakes/lapses pointed out the role of consciousness and memory
in error production and thus in error detection.
3.2. Prospective memory deﬁnition and Ellis model
Ellis (1996) described prospective remembering as ‘the processing that supports the
realization of delayed intentions and their associated actions. . .As such it is intimately
associated with the control and coordination of future actions and activities’. PM was
thus deﬁned as the ‘interface between memory, attention and action processes’.
Fundamental research on PM thus appeared likely to provide a new enlightenment for
the investigation of daily situations, including work situations, as conﬁrmed by a ﬁrst
study on PM requirements by air traﬃc controllers (Vortac et al. 1995).
PM was deﬁned in many diﬀerent ways: from ‘remembering what we must do’ (Neisser
1982) or ‘remembering to do something at a particular moment in the future’
(Kvavilashvili and Ellis 1996) to ‘realizing delayed intentions’ (Ellis 1996) and as the
‘timely execution of a previously formed intention’ (Kvavilashvili and Ellis 1996).
Most PM researchers suggest that the PM is responsible for the processes from
intention formation to timely appropriate intention retrieval. This appropriate time may
either be a well-speciﬁed time (time-based PM task) or may depend on the occurrence of a
given event (event-based PM task). The PM performance is considered to be correct since
the intention is appropriately retrieved, whatever happens during the realization of
action(s), making thus a strict distinction between PM failure and other forms of errors
(Kvavilashvili and Ellis 1996).
One may, however, consider that any error committed during the realization of an
action contributes to a failure of the global PM task. This has led to considering the PM
as a complex set of processes involved in the transformation of an intention into a
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‘consummatory action’ (Lewin 1961). As the main concern remains the detection of
errors, this second viewpoint on PM will be adopted.
This viewpoint is also endorsed by Ellis who, in 1996, suggested a global model of a
prospective task, which considers all phases from the ‘Formation and encoding of
intention and action’ to ‘Evaluation of outcome’. Ellis (1996) identiﬁes the ﬁve general
phases, as follows.
3.2.1. Formation and encoding of the intention and the action. At this stage, the individual
forms an intention and encodes three major elements:
1. The intention (deciding to do something, the ‘that element’).
2. The action (what the individual wants to do, the ‘what element’).
3. A context that describes the circumstances and the criterion of retrieval (when the
individual has to retrieve the intention and initiate the action, the ‘when element’).
These three elements constitute the content of the delayed intention. For example, a book
is borrowed and must be returned one week later (Monday). In this case, the encoding
includes the intention ‘I have to’, the content of the action ‘give back the book’ and the
temporal information ‘Monday’.
3.2.2. Retention interval. This interval corresponds to the time period between the
encoding and the beginning of an eventual performance interval. In the example, this
interval lasts 7 d. During this interval, the intention can be retrieved and refreshed by
spontaneous mechanisms or by external cues.
3.2.3. Performance interval. During this period, the encoded intention has to be
retrieved at least once and the action performed. Moreover, the actual situation has to be
identiﬁed as reﬂecting the initially established context of recuperation (the ‘when
element’), associated with the speciﬁc intention (the ‘that element’) and ﬁnally associated
with the intended action (the ‘what element’). In the example, the performance interval
lasts 1 d (Monday).
3.2.4. Initiation and execution of the intended action. The action is executed. In the
example, the person picks up the book and gives it back to the library.
3.2.5. The outcome evaluation. The action outcome is here evaluated in order to check
whether the action has been executed as intended. The existence of this last phase is also one
of the PM issues that hasmotivated the attempt to link error detectionwith PM.Ellis (1996)
justiﬁes it with the necessity of some form of outcome record in order to avoid the repetition
of a satisﬁed intentionor to ensure the success of a postponedor failed delayed intention (i.e.
avoiding the omission). One may also think that it is a key phase in which the subject may
compare the actual outcome with the expected one and thus detect at least a deviation.
However, the objective of this study is to go one step further by admitting that this phase
may actually last quite a long time, until the actual resumption of the intention, i.e. until the
individual feels, even subjectively, that his/her intended goal has been achieved.
Further investigation on the recording function itself, or ‘output monitoring’, (Koriat
and Ben Zur 1988, see also Kvavilashvili and Ellis 1996, for a ﬁrst analysis of the relation
to errors) might also provide interesting leads for understanding the cognitive dissonance
or the ‘feeling of uncompleted task’ that is often the ﬁrst step towards error detection. At
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the junction point between memory and action control, Koriat et al. (1990) studied the
processes involved in recording and distinguishing the performed actions from the actions
to be performed. These processes may be twofold:
1. A real-time marking of the performed task, deleting the intention. In the same way
that one tears up a written note, one can imagine an internal process erasing the
intention from a ‘mental scratch pad’. This on-line process is close to Lewin’s (1961)
notion of tension discharge and also to Reason’s (1990) notion of a programme
counter for checking oﬀ actions as they are executed. According to Dockree and Ellis
(2001), the process of cancelling the intention may be regulated by the supervisory
attentional system described by Norman and Shallice (1986).
2. A retrospective evaluation provoked by another opportunity in order to realize the
intention, either through the apparition of contextual factors or through a
spontaneous retrieval. In such cases, the individual has to scrutinize his/her memory
(or an external memo pad) looking for evidence that the intention has been executed.
Potential failure modes of this function oﬀer a compromise between memory failures and
errors, explaining errors related to the repetition or the omission of actions. In these
cases, the intention is correctly retrieved, but its status (realized or not yet realized) has
been forgotten. Deﬁcient output monitoring may result in:
. a failure to perform the act, due to a mistaken belief that it has already been
performed;
. a repetition of the act, due to a false belief that it has not been performed;
. checking to make sure that it has been performed, in case of uncertainty.
An earlier study by Wilkins and Baddeley (1978) showed less action repetitions than
action omissions. For Reason (1984), repeating planned acts is also infrequent among
action slips. This could be related to the ‘reality monitoring’, i.e. ‘how a person decides
whether he has performed an act or has only imagined it’. For Koriat et al. (1990), ‘it
would appear that a failure to perform an act should be more likely when it is
contemplated and planned in detail in advance’.
Considering the variety of external supports, one could suspect a wide variability in
internal processes. For Koriat and Ben Zur (1988), there is however ‘no conclusive
evidence that prospective plans are cancelled or tagged on-line upon completion’. On-line
cancellation is apparently not perfect, which explains this feeling of having forgotten (this
is the ﬁrst step towards detection). In these cases, individuals may ‘create’ supplementary
checking opportunities for themselves. Regarding retrospective monitoring, it appears
that people questioned about a performed action tend to check its performance through
the action’s result (sugar in the coﬀee) rather than by scrutinizing their memory on the
action itself.
Further studies on this output monitoring processes could thus provide explanations of
error detection mechanisms by explaining why and how intentions remain in the memory,
especially why a person will go on thinking of an intention even when he/she has
performed the corresponding action:
. A wrong marking of the intention.




Some philosophers tend to deﬁne human behaviour as a set of events caused by intentions
(Harre´ 1982, Brand 1984), but it remains diﬃcult to deﬁne what an ‘intention’ is.
Intentions are diﬀerent from retrospective memories, both for what concerns their
representations as for their status. Intentions may be retrieved and have to be activated at
any time (Hicks et al. 2000). They are thus stored in memory with speciﬁc characteristics
and they have a particular status in the memory. Some experimental and neuropsycho-
logical evidence seems to be emerging from the literature, suggesting that an intention is
encoded under a functionally diﬀerent form than the other memories and the stored
representations of an intention may reside in memory under a privileged status (Shallice
and Burgess 1991, Gsochke and Kuhl 1993, Marsh et al. 1998a, 1999). That special
dynamic status may be a relatively higher activation level compared with neutral
memories with a quicker than average revival rate when being retrieved, this is named the
intention superiority eﬀect (ISE) (Marsh et al. 2002). The ISE is characterized by faster
response time to task material intended for future performance than for neutral material
with no associated intention or material that is linked to a cancelled intention (Goschke
and Kuhl 1993, Dockree and Ellis 2001).
In order to cover the diversity of intentions, Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1996) gave a
ﬂexible deﬁnition as ‘a person’s readiness to act in a certain way in the future, where what
has to be done and when it has to be done are deﬁned with more or less clarity’.
Compared to other deﬁnitions this one focuses on the that/what/when aspects (see Ellis
1996) rather than the who/where/how components, considered as further speciﬁcations of
the former. The way these components interact with each other and their relative
importance in intention forming will lead to a representation of the intention. Moreover,
this representation may evolve according to constraints or events intervening during the
retention interval, thus provoking successive attempts for re-encoding the intention. It is
here possible to detect and correct some kinds of ill-formed intentions. For example, one
may retrieve an intention and realize that it is in conﬂict or not compatible with
previously scheduled constraints. An intention may also be modiﬁed because the
associated consummatory action is not really satisfying: ‘phone mother’ may be replaced
by ‘write to mother’ without any speciﬁc external constraint.
For Ellis (1996) and Mantyla (1996), forming an intention allows a sensitivity to
speciﬁc external cues, depending on the relative importance of the intention’s
components. Lewin (1961) also considered that when an individual forms an intention,
objects and events in their environment acquire what he calls a ‘valence’ in relation to this
intention. This sensibility (or valence) is speciﬁc for each individual and may also play a
speciﬁc role in the production of errors, as well as in their detection. An excessive
accuracy of the cues associated with the intention may cause the prevention of the
fulﬁlment of the intention with a substitute action, while it could make the detection
easier. On the contrary, an intention showing a small dependency to external cues may
lead to premature acts or to action performance when the situation is not appropriate,
with few possibilities for detecting it.
Further distinctions have been made among intentions. Searle (1983) distinguished
prior intentions, which are the result of a conscious decision to act in a certain way (see
e.g. Brand 1984, Heckhausen and Kuhl 1985, Nuttin 1987) and intentions-in-action
(spontaneous action, not associated with a prior intention). Prior intentions may be
carried out immediately after the decision (immediate intentions) or be postponed
(delayed intentions). While PM research usually focuses on the latter, the various types of
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intentions will be considered. Indeed, these distinctions actually reﬂect the relationship
between memory, intention and action, as well as the role of consciousness in the
development of an intention, i.e. precisely the factors supposed to have an inﬂuence on
the possibility of detection.
Lewin (1961) suggested a theory, according to which the intention, once formed, is like
a need that requires to be satisﬁed. Forming an intention thus creates a tension that needs
to be released. Lewin (1961) notices, however, that the satisfaction of an intention is not
fully related to its representation (e.g. the intention to write to a friend may be satisﬁed by
an opportunistic phone call. In that case, one may suppose that the ‘right’ intention was
to contact this friend). He thus creates the concept of a ‘substitute action’, or an ‘action
appropriate to the situation’, i.e. an action allowing the intention’s satisfaction, diﬀerent
from the initial one. The means for the intention’s resumption emerge here from the
concrete situation. This is close to the more recent concept of ‘opportunistic planning’.
This concept of substitute action actually supports the hypothesis that an individual has a
natural tendency to satisfy their intentions and thus a tendency to detect non-satisﬁed
intentions.
3.4. Intention retrievals: what brings intentions to mind
Intention retrievals occur both during the retention interval (keeping the intention in
mind until the performance interval) and after the supposed realization of the intention.
Most people have indeed already shouted: ‘I forgot to buy some bread’, ‘I have not
ﬁnished writing this letter’, ‘I have signed the wrong paper’ quite a long time after the
described action and apparently without any external cue. In such cases, error detection is
due to a spontaneous retrieval of the intention after its supposed realization.
Most authors of PM consider two kinds of mechanisms bringing intentions to mind:
1. Outside-in retrievals are contextual and triggered by an element, a person or an event
in the environment that was associated with the intention, or at least with its
representation. There is a huge variety of external factors likely to remind people of
an intention, sometimes the associations are quite surprising because they depend on
each person’s experience or personality. For example, seeing a bank may remind an
individual that he/she has a ﬁnancial operation to perform, while seeing a bank will
remind someone else that he/she has to phone his/her brother (who is a banker).
2. Inside-out retrievals, the intention comes to mind without any external cue. In these
cases, one may suppose the existence of an internal mechanism bringing intentions to
mind, more or less regularly and during a given period of time. Some authors evoke
here a kind of internal marker met from time to time by a wandering thinking.
Another alternative would be a subject’s control on retrieval initiation, particularly on
their frequency. It then appears that intentions are alternatively conscious and
unconscious, coming across a kind of threshold. As emphasized by Einstein and
MacDaniel (1996), ‘one of the most salient features of PM retrieval is that it often
occurs spontaneously and without conscious attempts to interrogate memory’. In the
introduction of Prospective Memory: Theory and Applications (Brandimonte et al.
1996), the authors pointed out that the ‘prospective memory may provide new and
interesting avenues for examining issues related to implicit or non-conscious retrieval’.
In both cases, the attention is strongly involved as these retrievals occur when
participants perform tasks requiring more or less attention. The attention dedicated to
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another activity may reduce sensitivity to contextual factors or directly interfere with an
internal control process. The Simple Activation Model (Einstein and MacDaniel 1996)
identiﬁes interactions between these two diﬀerent kinds of mechanisms. In this model, the
representation of an intention creates and activates an association between action and
cues. The activation level of these associations remains below a ‘conscious awareness’
threshold and keeps decreasing as long as the subjects are involved in other activities,
unless a reactivation through contextual factors or thoughts is initiated in an internal way
(intention retrievals). Ellis (1996) also emphasizes that the role of these ‘recollections of
delayed intentions’ is multiple. They may refresh or reinforce the intention in memory by
re-increasing the activation level but they also provide opportunities for reformulating or
modifying the intention, thus facilitating not only an opportunistic behaviour but also the
recovery of ill-formed intentions.
An in situ study (Sellen et al. 1996) focuses on these intention retrievals. Participants
were assigned two kinds of PM tasks: time-based; and event-based. Furthermore, they
were required to signal (using an electronic badge) each time they remembered the
corresponding intention. Such a protocol allowed the recording, not only at what time the
participants remembered their intention, but also in which conditions (place, activity,
etc.)
This study provided some interesting results. The number of retrievals evolves with
time: the experiment was conducted during a whole week, a decrease of this number of
retrievals was noticed. This may be due to a decrease in the motivation or to tiredness,
but one may also interpret it as a learning process leading to an eﬃcient number of
retrievals, i.e. a number both necessary and suﬃcient. It has also been noticed that
intention memories are more often due to contextual factors than to spontaneous or
controlled retrievals. Little by little, participants may create associations, which are likely
to help them to retrieve their intention. Results on the non-randomness of retrievals also
suggest a participant’s partial control on inside-out retrievals (at least on their frequency).
The conscious nature of retrievals also appears in the interviews ‘make myself aware of
the task’, ‘keep the task in mind’.
3.5. Intention persistence
A main characteristic of PM tasks and one of the motivations for relating PM and error
detection is the persistence of intentions, or what Lewin (1961) called the ‘intention-
eﬀect’. The question, however, remains: ‘Why, how and how long do intentions persist,
even after their realization?’. According to Goschke and Kuhl (1993), persisting
activation of the intention should have especially an adaptive role in time-based tasks
for which any external cue can help to remember the prospective task.
In the experiment conducted by Sellen et al. (1996), the distribution of retrievals can be
compared to the occurrence of task opportunities: subjects think of their intention both
before and after opportunities (less after); and the retrieval probability before or after a
failure (not realizing the task in spite of an opportunity to do it) is smaller than the
retrieval probability before or after a success. Marsh et al. (1998a, 1999) showed a
heightened activation of intention prior to performance and an intention inhibition eﬀect
after its completion.
Other experiments show that longer retention intervals could induce a better PM
performance (Marsh et al. 1998b, Hicks et al. 2000). During this retention interval, the
PM performance ﬁrst follows the forgetting curve (2 min) and then increases. This might
be explained by the fact that longer intervals allow both a greater number and a greater
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regularity of intention retrievals (refreshment of the intention). These studies also show
the role of ‘breaks’ between two activities.
In the experiment by Sellen et al. (1996), the authors investigated whether some places
were more favourable to intention retrievals. They were also led to diﬀerentiate between
places being associated with an activity and other places, called transition places. These
transition places are, for example, corridors or any location between two activity places;
they are not associated with a particular activity and are probably related to the ‘breaks’
mentioned above. Park et al. (1997) also showed that concurrent activity had more
impact on an event-based prospective task than on a time-based task and emphasized the
importance of the ongoing activities in explaining PM performances. This series of
experiments thus suggest that activity-based PM, i.e. when the appropriate time is deﬁned
by the end of an activity, should be a supplementary component in the usual
classiﬁcation, in addition to time-based and event-based tasks.
It has been shown that error detection is due to the occurrence of intention retrievals
after the appropriate time for action execution. One may thus suppose that the eﬀective
intention realization is not the only criterion for suppressing this intention from the set of
to-be-performed actions. More particularly, the objective realization is not always
associated with a subjective feeling of goal achievement. In studies on task interruption,
Mantyla (1996) echoes Zeigarnik’s (1927) viewpoint, i.e. that the crucial factor is not the
objective completion or interruption of a task but rather a subjective feeling of having
ﬁnished a task or, on the contrary, of being unsatisﬁed:
a quasi-need persists if the task has not been completed to the subject’s own
satisfaction regardless of whether this is equivalent to what may seem from another
person’s inspection to constitute ‘ﬁnished’ or ‘unﬁnished’. Tasks with whose
solution the subject is not content will function in his memory as ‘unﬁnished’ even
though the experimenter may have classiﬁed them as completed and vice versa.
Lewin (1961) also observed quite early on how the ‘intention-eﬀect’ may manifest itself
through a tendency to complete interrupted activities without requiring an external
stimulus and sometimes after relatively long intervals: ‘there is still something to be done’.
Indeed, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) obtained results that provide clear support for Lewin’s
persistence hypothesis and developed the concept of ISE showing that intentions produce
a persisting ‘task tension’ leading to superior recall of incomplete activities (Zeigarnik
1927, Goschke and Kuhl 1993).
3.6. Episodic actions vs. habitual actions
Most PM studies concern experimental tasks, dealing with the capacity to remember an
exceptional intention. It is thus not clear whether their results on PM characteristics
remain valid for the persistence of intentions related to habitual actions (Meacham and
Leiman, 1982). The role of intention itself in the performance of habitual actions is
probably quite diﬀerent from its role in the performance of episodic actions. People are,
however, susceptible to commit errors, including omission, in both types of actions.
Moreover, this distinction is a major point in the case of routine errors.
As already evoked in the in situ study by Sellen et al. (1996), Meacham and Leiman
(1982) supposed that retrievals of habitual actions rely progressively more on associations
with contextual factors and more particularly in relation to another activity. These
associations would build up through successive realizations of the action. Ellis (1996)
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emphasized that the robustness of these connections will precisely distinguish habitual
actions from episodic actions. A strategy for remembering episodic actions more easily is
thus to integrate them in the course of habitual actions. Lewin (1961) also considered that
learning modiﬁes the valence of objects and events with regard to intentions.
Among episodic actions, one may again distinguish between the tasks to be retrieved
only once and the tasks to be retrieved several times. The latter seem to be an
intermediate, but necessary, step in the transformation of an episodic action into an
habitual one. In a diary study Andrzejewski et al. (1991) showed the importance of these
repeated episodic intentions: for example, the probability to retrieve an appointment
increases with the number of realized appointments. It remains, however, diﬃcult to
know whether the inﬂuencing factor is the frequency of the action realization or its
regularity. Further investigations should thus concern the role of this progressive
contextualization of intentions on error detection and whether detection mechanisms are
diﬀerent for episodic action and for habitual ones.
3.7. Prospective memory and frontal lobes
PM is the memory for future actions and is thus much less tractable in the laboratory
(Baddeley and Wilkins 1984). Most authors adopt the position that PM is not unitary
and involves diﬀerent processes underlain by diﬀerent brain structures (Glisky 1996,
Palmer and McDonald 2000). Some cognitive mechanisms involved in prospective
remembering are self-directed planning, organization, sustained attention, concentration,
inhibition process and retrospective memory. In fact, PM tasks include both retrospective
and prospective components (Kvavilashvili 1987, Einstein and McDaniel 1990,
Brandimonte and Passolunghi 1994, Ellis 1996). Therefore, some PM processes are
similar to those involved in retrospective memory, while others have to be speciﬁc to PM
and controlled by the frontal cortex.
The frontal lobes are the last developed cerebral area during phylogenesis and
ontogenesis, but they are also the largest. They support the highest levels of cognitive
functioning, called executive functions. They are morphologically complex and richly
connected to every other area in the brain. They are required for language, planning and
monitoring non-routine activities, problem-solving, initiating activity, monitoring and
evaluating behaviours and outcomes. For example, they play an organizational and
strategic role in memory tasks, they help to organize recall, ﬁnd the right cue, etc.
Moreover, the prefrontal cortex seems to play an important role in the activation of
memories and in the maintenance of the relevant representations and activities.
All these functions of frontal lobes are necessary for an eﬀective PM functioning. In
fact, PM involves the formation and the organization of intentions, the intention recall
during a lapse of time, the monitoring of the way to execute action and, ﬁnally, the action
execution and the recollection of having done it (Bisiacchi 1996). All these abilities
require the activation of frontal lobes. Furthermore, the intended action has to be
initiated and frontal lobes are responsible for the initiating activity. This activation occurs
either from environmental stimulus (as in the event-based tasks) or spontaneously
without cue in the environment (as in the time-based tasks). Time-based prospective
remembering is assumed to be more diﬃcult because it requires more self-initiated
retrieval processes (and thus more involvement of frontal lobes) than event-based
prospective remembering. This is the well-known diﬀerence between the time-based and
event-based tasks (Einstein and McDaniel 1990). Indeed, people with frontal lesions or
the elderly (in the ageing process, the frontal lobes are the ﬁrst cerebral area aﬀected) are
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particularly in trouble in time-based tasks while they quasi normally perform in event-
based tasks (Shapiro et al. 1998).
The inhibition process is another executive function and also depends on the frontal
lobes. PM requires the intervention of an inhibition mechanism (Kerns 2000). In fact, the
reﬂexes and the dominant behaviours have to be inhibited in order to maintain the
relevant representations active and so to achieve the ﬁxed goal. In PM tasks, the
competitive behaviours that are not appropriate are inhibited and the ongoing behaviour
often has to be stopped to allow the execution of the intended action (Cohen and O’Reilly
1996). For example, when one goes back home, one has to stop the car to re-fuel or to go
shopping. One has to stop an ongoing or a usual behaviour in order to perform an
intended action, which is unusual or not quite usual. The inhibition process is thus very
important for PM performance. Indeed, PM failures are notably caused by interference
with interpolating activities (Brandimonte and Passolunghi 1994).
Finally, the monitoring process also depends on the frontal lobes. Thus, outcome
evaluation, the ultimate phase in Ellis’ model, involves the activation of the frontal lobes.
Therefore, error detection, which can ensue from this evaluation, implies the intervention
of the frontal lobes.
4. Detection model
Following these overviews on error detection and PM, a preliminary model of error
detection summarizing the various concepts mentioned may be presented as follows. As
seen in ﬁgure 1, it is based on the chronology deﬁned by Ellis’ model for a PM task.
Intention formation may lead to ill-formed intentions, i.e. mistakes. These mistakes
may then be detected and re-formulated during the retention interval, following intention
retrieval. Otherwise, their detection will be possible only after an error occurrence when
the outcome is not correct. Intention retrievals occurring during the performance interval
provoke the action initiation, leading either to an ‘error sketching out’ (i.e. immediately
Figure 1. Error detection model from Ellis prospective memory model. PE=error
positivity.
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detected and corrected) or to action execution. Slips may occur during action execution
and may be detected either through action-based or through outcome-based detection.
When an action is not initiated during the performance interval it is a lapse, detected only
through outcome-based detection. Intention retrievals occurring after the performance
interval provoke a retrospective evaluation of the action and outcome, thus allowing for
further detection possibilities.
5. Final conclusion
The choice of Reason’s (1990) classiﬁcation into lapses/mistakes/slips allowed the
investigation of parallel existing studies on error detection and research concerning
various aspects of PM. Thus, it could be pointed out that various mechanisms are taking
part in the detection of the diﬀerent types of errors, while identifying, at the same time,
transversal issues. First, a major relationship with intention, both for error production
and for error detection; second, a general possibility to identify action-based detection
and outcome-based detection. Slips appear to be more easily detectable than mistakes,
while omissions – speciﬁc kinds of lapses – seem to require a separate analysis. Finally,
this classiﬁcation is based on the individual’s role in error production. The subjective
component involved in error detection has also been emphasized both by researches on
PM and intention theory and by data on cerebral waves (ERN and PE).
The ﬁrst overview of the relationships between PM (and more generally the theory of
intentions) and error detection raises some questions likely to support further studies.
The usual classiﬁcation of PM tasks into time-based and event-based tasks could provide
a canvas for the identiﬁcation of detectable errors (vs. undetectable errors) as well as for
the diﬀerent mechanisms involved in the detection. Combined with knowledge on output-
monitoring, this classiﬁcation could also be enriched by the notion of the activity-based
task that was, until now, considered too close to the event-based task and by the mode of
task management, distinguishing between active tasks and passive tasks. This distinction,
already evoked by Lewis (1997), could maybe be related to the ‘personality regions’
concept (Lewin 1961).
As mentioned before, the output monitoring function could be investigated more
deeply, especially as far as the status of interrupted, uncompleted or even mis-completed
tasks are concerned.
Regarding intention retrievals occurring after action realization, it would be interesting
to study whether their nature and frequency are related to the way the task has been
performed, including the case of action omission. Another point is the duration of the
interval during which retrievals occur after the action. Is this duration dependent on the
retention interval? Is it task-dependent? Is it a constant? Following the hypothesis of a
very early unconscious detection, one could also suggest that these retrievals are fully
suitable to favour detection. This could also be related to Lewin’s (1961) theory,
postulating that individuals look for each opportunity to satisfy the intention.
More generally, it also appears necessary to study the role of personality variables
(attentional abilities, motivational aspects) explaining why an intention becomes
important for an individual, thus allowing its persistence and maybe the detection of
associated errors. Indeed, it appears that PM performance is strongly related to the
importance that someone can attach to the intention (Cicogna and Nigro 1998) and this
may be due to speciﬁc variables that remain diﬃcult to control.
Even if the localization is not perfectly known, EEG waves appear in frontal regions
and concepts mentioned in these prospective issues appear to be strongly related to the
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functioning of frontal lobes, responsible for planning, inhibition of competitive
behaviours, action initiation and monitoring of behaviours and outcomes. First, a slip
is detected when the attention goes back to the initial intention or plan. This change in the
attention focus is permitted by the intervention of the frontal lobes. Sometimes, slips are
caused by the non-inhibition of a routine activity that is executed instead of the intended
unusual action. These slips could be due to a bad functioning of the frontal lobes, while
their detection occurs when a correct intervention of the frontal lobes allows the
monitoring of a behaviour or outcome.
Second, a mistake is due to an ill-formed intention. The frontal lobes are responsible
for planning activities and formulating plans. They are thus at the origin of the mistake,
but they are also involved in error detection by allowing the outcome evaluation.
Moreover, the plans show the way that the automatic activation has to follow. They
play the role of a guide. They constitute a solid base for the detection and recuperation of
errors (Doireau et al. 1997, Scheﬀers and Coles 2000). Patients with frontal lesions often
have trouble in planning and/or sustaining attention. The behavioural pattern looks like
slips occurring in healthy persons (Reason 1990).
These preliminary investigations have encouraged the desire to give a greater place to
the detection of errors, which is a way to recognize the positive and formative role of
errors. Detecting his/her own errors is indeed what characterizes the expert. The capacity
to detect and recover errors is often considered as the transition from a novice stage to a
stage of deeper knowledge (Adams and Goetz 1973). Allwood (1984) also showed that the
individual’s performance is not characterized by the frequency of errors, but rather by the
person’s eﬃciency in detecting these errors. For Amalberti (1996), the best participants
are not the ones who do not commit any error, but the ones who detect their errors. Most
teachers could say the same, both about their best pupils and about themselves. This
could be explained by the greater possibility for an expert to dedicate attentional
resources to error detection when he/she is involved in a familiar task.
Earlier authors have already underlined that teaching and training programmes should
include detection and recovery techniques as well as error prevention (Reason 1990),
whilst also stressing the importance of favouring a spontaneous detection by operators
(De Keyser and Nyssen 1993). Indeed, the error is not to be considered only under a
negative aspect (Wehner and Stadler 1994). Making errors plays a part in learning and in
the adaptation processes. In learning processes, the errors delay the transition towards
the automation of a new skill and they allow the re-evaluation of already automated skills
(Reason 1990). Following a biological and evolutionist theory of error, Hasbroucq et al.
(2000) considered error as a means for the individual to generate, discover and select new
behaviours more likely to be adapted to further situations. Moreover, errors may
stimulate creativity and the adoption of new exploratory strategies (Reason 1990).
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